

## SK ID Solutions AS Trust Services Practice Statement

Version 12.0  
Effective from 15.01.2024

Document Information	
Date	Changes
15.01.2024 12.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular review and update of references performed;</li> <li>• Clause 1.1 – Diagrams updated;</li> <li>• Clauses 6.1.1, 6.1.6, 6.2.1, 6.2.3 – Allowed HSM conformity to FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3.</li> </ul>
15.01.2023 11.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clause 1.6.2 added acronym;</li> <li>• Clause 6.2.1 described SK duties for HSM lifecycle management, and requirements for QSCD handling and storing;</li> <li>• Clause 9.4.1 added that data protection acts other than General Data Protection Regulation and Personal Data Protection Act might be relevant for adhering to personal data protection requirements;</li> <li>• Clause 9.15 added reference to related norms of countries, where Trust Services are provided.</li> </ul>
15.12.2021 10.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Description of new SK's PKI hierarchy has been updated in clause 1.1;</li> <li>• clauses 5. and 5.7.1 rephrased term reflecting periodicity of risk assessment;</li> <li>• clause 5.7.1 reference added to SK Internal Crisis Management Regulation for requirement of appointing a responsible person for implementation of follow-up activities;</li> <li>• clause 6.3.2 clarification of terminology;</li> <li>• clause 9.7. rephrased SK liability for the secrecy of Subscribers private keys.</li> </ul>
12.05.2021 9.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• clause 1.1 new root G1 with subordinate CA-s and other changes related to the migration to the new root are included;</li> <li>• clause 1.1 reference to Baseline Requirements taken out as not normative document for SK trust services anymore;</li> <li>• clause 1.5.2 contact person changes due to the structural changes in SK ID Solution organisation;</li> <li>• clause 2.3.1 term from GDPR adopted;</li> <li>• clause 4.3.1 in case QSCD certificate expired and invalidated Subscriber certificates will be revoked upon investigation;</li> <li>• clause 5.2.1 employees are assigned into Trusted Roles with internal regulation of SK, which defines also functions and responsibility for Trusted Role;</li> <li>• clause 5.4.1 who creates logs is specified;</li> <li>• clause 5.4.2 responsible persons for log processing changed due to the structural changes in SK ID Solution organisation;</li> <li>• clause 5.4.3 retention of logs specified</li> <li>• clause 5.4.4 security measures of protection of logs expressed in more general way as containing more methods;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• clause 8.1 internal audits are periodical and conducted according to internal plan.</li> </ul>
<p>15.04.2020 8.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• URL-s and e-mail addresses are corrected and updated through the SK PS;</li> <li>• clause 1.6.1 termin of Digital Siganture is replaced with Electronic Signature;</li> <li>• clause 2.3 references to SK PS 4.9.7 and 4.9.9 is removed and substituted with statement that information on certification status is published in accordance with relevant service-based Policies and/or Practice Statements;</li> <li>• clause 5 the statement about minimum regularity for risk assessment is added;</li> <li>• clause 5.2.2 the statement about necessary personnel regarding backup and restore functions needed is specified;</li> <li>• clause 5.4.2 the statement regarding system auditors role in processing audit log is added;</li> <li>• clause 5.7.1 the statement about minimum regularity for risk assessment is added;</li> <li>• clause 5.7.1 statement about SK follow-up and improvement activities in order to avoid security incidents and disasters is added;</li> <li>• clause 5.8 is updated to sincronize it with internal termination plan;</li> <li>• clause 6.1.1 the statement is added that SK does keep the number of personnel minimum to carry out CA key pair generation;</li> <li>• clause 6.1.1 the statement is added that SK does not issue cross-certificates and use them;</li> <li>• clause 6.6.3 statement about regular annual review of SK policies, assets and practices is added;</li> <li>• clause 6.7 statement about the development and test environment isolation from production environment is added;</li> <li>• clause 6.8 statement about time synchronization regularity with UTC is added.</li> </ul>
<p>02.02.2020 7.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• clause 1.5 webpage address has changed to skidsolutions.eu;</li> <li>• clause 1.5.4 position name of Business Development Manager was corrected;</li> <li>• clause 2.3.1 removed service specific address;</li> <li>• clause 5.4.2 position Product Manager replaced with Service Manager;</li> <li>• clause 5.8. – CA termination specified;</li> <li>• clause 6.1.4 - removed last sentence related to issuing TLS Server certificates, which SK does not issue anymore;</li> <li>• clause 6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods specified;</li> <li>• clause 9.4 corrected references;</li> <li>• clause 9.11 corrected webpage address;</li> <li>• clause 9.17 corrected references.</li> </ul>
<p>17.10.2018 6.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• clause 1.1 PKI hierarchy updated;</li> <li>• clause 2.4 access control to the repository protection is added;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• clause 4.1 sub-clauses are added;</li> <li>• clause 4.1.3 control of QSCD certification status is added;</li> <li>• Clause 5.2.2 backup and recovery performed by system administrators in trusted roles;</li> <li>• Clause 5.5.1 information about types of archived records is added;</li> <li>• Clause 5.5.2 information about the retention of archived records is moved from 5.4.3;</li> <li>• Clause 5.7.1 actions regarding algorithm compromise is moved from 5.8 and amended;</li> <li>• Clause 5.7.4 added that backup arrangements are regularly tested;</li> <li>• Clause 6.1.6 public key parameters and quality check for Trust Service key pair is added;</li> <li>• Clause 6.2.1 added that SK verifies whether HSM is functioning;</li> <li>• Clause 6.5.1 added security controls to protect media and ensure that records will be retained within required period;</li> <li>• Clause 6.5.1 added statement regarding security controls and access control avoid attempts to modify certificate and revocation status information in service-related applications;</li> <li>• Clause 6.5.1 added statement about multi-factor authentication for critical applications;</li> <li>• Clause 6.6.1 added statement about documenting changes;</li> <li>• Clause 6.7 added statement regarding secure communication between trustworthy systems.</li> </ul>
<p>25.06.2018 5.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• clause 5 added statement regarding management approval for risk assessment and residual risks;</li> <li>• clause 5.2.1 added statement that requirements are applicable to all personnel – with the temporary or permanent employment contract;</li> <li>• clause 5.2.1 specified the statement that RA Officer is acting in Trusted Role;</li> <li>• clause 5.3.1 statements are added, how impartiality is ensured by SK;</li> <li>• clause 5.7.1 statement is added when and how critical vulnerabilities are addressed;</li> <li>• clause 6.1.1 specified statements regarding procedure for key generation for SK Trust Services;</li> <li>• clause 6.6.3 specified statement regarding reviewing practices;</li> <li>• clause 6.7 added statement regarding separated networks for administration of IT systems and TSP operational network;</li> <li>• clause 6.7 specified statement regarding high level availability of external access and redundancy;</li> <li>• clause 9.6.1 added specified statement that SK carries overall responsibility for conformance with procedures, policies and practice statements even in case of outsourcing party is involved.</li> </ul>
<p>07.03.2018 4.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• due to change of SK's business name from AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus to SK ID Solutions AS, name of SK PS has been changed accordingly. Also, former business name has been replaced with the new one within this document;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• clause 1.1 the PKI hierarchy picture was updated, Mobile-ID certificates for Lithuania under EID-SK 2016 added;</li> <li>• clause 1.6.1 added GDPR to the terminology section;</li> <li>• clause 5.3.7 the statement about independent contractors was added;</li> <li>• clause 5.7.1 statement regarding the regularity of risk assessment were changed, SK carries out the risk assessment more than once in the year;</li> <li>• clause 5.7.1 added that Data Inspectorate will be informed about relevant security breach of personal data within 72 hours as regulated in GDPR;</li> <li>• clause 6.5.1 deleted the statement that SK has no defined capacity management process. The capacity management process is implemented;</li> <li>• clause 9.6.1 added obligations to notify of personal data breach Data Inspectorate and related natural or legal persons;</li> <li>• clause 9.6.1 the statement about the disabled users was specified;</li> <li>• clause 9.7 corrected wording in the second section;</li> <li>• clause 9.15 relevant laws and standards were added;</li> <li>• references of laws and standards were added.</li> <li>• also, some minor corrections of misspellings and translation were made.</li> </ul>
01.01.2017 3.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• clause 1.1 the figure and statement regarding expired root certification authority Juur-SK is taken out;</li> <li>• clause 1.1 the figure of root certification authority EE Certification Centre Root CA is renewed;</li> <li>• clause 6.1.1 the description regarding generation of new certification authority is added;</li> <li>• clause 9.6.1 the statement regarding accessibility of disabled persons is added;</li> <li>• clause 9.6.1 the statement regarding contractual relationship with subcontracting, outsourcing or other third-party arrangements is added.</li> </ul>
01.07.2016 2.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following amendments and additions were made:</li> <li>• clause 6.1.1 the key ceremony commission is appointed by CEO with internal regulation. The commission has to include the external auditor independent of SK;</li> <li>• clause 6.2.1 HSM is the FIPS mode activated;</li> <li>• clause 6.2.1 SK checks and verifies that HSM is not tampered after its receive and installation. This is documented in a HSM life-cycle protocol.</li> </ul>
01.04.2016 1.9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft version of SK PS version 2.0 valid from 01.07.2016.</li> <li>• Redesigned according to RFC 3647.</li> <li>• Amendments regarding eIDAS Regulation compliance.</li> </ul>
01.10.2014 1.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First public version.</li> </ul>

1	Introduction.....	8
1.1	Overview .....	8
1.2	Document Name and Identification .....	10
1.3	PKI Participants .....	10
1.4	Certificate Usage .....	11
1.5	Policy Administration.....	11
1.6	Definitions and Acronyms .....	12
2	Publication and repository responsibilities .....	15
2.1.	Repositories.....	15
2.2.	Publication of Information .....	15
2.3.	Time or Frequency of Publication .....	15
2.4.	Access Controls on Repositories .....	16
3.	Identification and authentication.....	17
3.1.	Naming.....	17
3.2.	Initial Identity Validation.....	17
3.3.	Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests .....	17
3.4.	Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request.....	17
4.	Certificate life-cycle operational requirements .....	18
4.1.	Certificate Application .....	18
4.2.	Certificate Application Processing.....	18
4.3.	Certificate Issuance.....	18
4.4.	Certificate Acceptance .....	18
4.5.	Key Pair and Certificate Usage .....	18
4.6.	Certificate Renewal.....	18
4.7.	Certificate Re-Key.....	18
4.8.	Certificate Modification .....	18
4.9.	Certificate Revocation and Suspension.....	18
4.10.	Certificate Status Services .....	19
4.11.	End of Subscription.....	19
4.12.	Key Escrow and Recovery.....	19
5.	Facility, management, and operational controls .....	20
5.1.	Physical Controls .....	20
5.2.	Procedural Controls .....	21
5.3.	Personnel Controls .....	22
5.4.	Audit Logging Procedures.....	24
5.5.	Records Archival.....	26

5.6.	Key Changeover.....	26
5.7.	Compromise and Disaster Recovery.....	26
5.8.	CA Termination .....	28
6.	Technical security controls.....	30
6.1.	Key Pair Generation and Installation .....	30
6.2.	Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls.....	31
6.3.	Other Aspects of Key Pair Management.....	32
6.4.	Activation Data.....	33
6.5.	Computer Security Controls .....	33
6.6.	Life Cycle Technical Controls .....	34
6.7.	Network Security Controls .....	35
6.8.	Time-Stamping.....	35
7.	Certificate, CRL, and OCSP profiles.....	36
7.1.	Certificate Profile.....	36
7.2.	CRL Profile.....	36
7.3.	OCSP Profile .....	36
8.	Compliance audit and other assessments.....	37
8.1.	Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment .....	37
8.2.	Identity/Qualifications of Assessor.....	37
8.3.	Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity .....	37
8.4.	Topics Covered by Assessment.....	37
8.5.	Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency .....	37
8.6.	Communication of Results.....	37
9.	Other business and legal matters.....	39
9.1.	Fees.....	39
9.2.	Financial Responsibility .....	39
9.3.	Confidentiality of Business Information.....	39
9.4.	Privacy of Personal Information.....	40
9.5.	Intellectual Property Rights .....	40
9.6.	Representations and Warranties .....	40
9.7.	Disclaimers of Warranties .....	42
9.8.	Limitations of Liability.....	43
9.9.	Indemnities.....	43
9.10.	Term and Termination .....	43
9.11.	Individual Notices and Communications with Participants.....	43
9.12.	Amendments.....	43



9.13.	Dispute Resolution Provisions .....	43
9.14.	Governing Law .....	44
9.15.	Compliance with Applicable Law.....	44
9.16.	Miscellaneous Provisions .....	44
9.17.	Other Provisions.....	45

# 1 Introduction

AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus was founded on March 26th, 2001. In December of 2016 the business name was changed from AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus to SK ID Solutions AS (hereafter SK). Owners of the limited liability company are AS Swedbank, AS SEB Pank and Telia Eesti AS. Principal activities of SK are offering trust services and related technical solutions in the Baltic region. These services guarantee secure and verified electronic communication with public institutions as well as businesses in everyday life.

Inspired by the ETSI EN 319 400 series, SK has divided its documentation into three parts:

- SK Trust Services Practice Statement (SK PS) describes general practices common to all trust services;
- Certification Practice Statements and Time-Stamping Authority Practice Statement describe parts that are specific to each Subordinate CA or Time-Stamping Unit;
- Technical Profiles are in separate documents.

Pursuant to the IETF RFC 3647 [4] this document is divided into nine parts. To preserve the outline specified by RFC 3647 [4], section headings that do not apply have the statement "Not applicable". Sections that describe actions specific to a single service contain only references to service-specific practice statements. If the subsections are omitted, a single reference applies to all of them.


## 1.1 Overview

SK is currently using two certificate chains. Root certification authorities are EE Certification Centre Root CA and EE-GovCA2018.

The relations between EE Certification Centre Root CA, its subordinate CAs and the CPs as well as the relation between EE-GovCA2018 and its subordinate CA and the CP are shown on the following figure:

EE Certification Centre Root CA chain, valid 2010-2030

EE-GovCA2018 chain, valid 2018-2033




Provided that all the applicable legal requirements (conformity assessment as well as granted status by the Supervisory Body) are met, Certificates will be issued under the new chains – SK ID Solutions ROOT G1E (ECC) and SK ID Solutions ROOT G1R (RSA). Certificates will be issued from one CA chain at a time. SK ID Solutions ROOT G1E will be primary and SK ID Solutions ROOT G1R will be secondary CA chain. The relations




between SK ID Solutions ROOT G1E and SK ID Solutions ROOT G1R and its subordinate CAs and the CPs are shown on the following figures.

SK ID Solutions ROOT G1E chain, valid 2021-2041:



SK ID Solutions ROOT G1R chain, valid 2021-2041:



More detailed information about PKI hierarchy and usage of subordinate CA-s can be found in relevant service-based Practice Statement.

SK ID Solutions AS Trust Services Practices Statement (SK PS) presents the criteria established by SK to provide electronic Trust Services, which enhance trust and confidence in electronic transactions. SK PS describes SK ID Solutions AS (SK) practices of providing Qualified Trust Services in conformity with the eIDAS regulation [1], legal acts of Estonia, ETSI EN 319 401 General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers [2], and other related service-based standard requirements.

This SK PS describes practices necessary for the achievement of the security level approved by SK management. SK has achieved ISO/IEC 27001: 2013 certification. The statement of applicability includes detailed description of security measures.

In the event of conflict between SK PS and the practice statements of specific services, the provisions of the practice statements of specific services shall prevail. In the event of conflict between the original document in English and the translated document in Estonian, the original document in English shall prevail.

## 1.2 Document Name and Identification

This document is called “SK ID Solution - AS Trust Services Practice Statement.”

## 1.3 PKI Participants

### 1.3.1 Trust Service Provider

SK is Trust Service Provider (TSP). The roles of SK as TSP are defined in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

Obligations and warranties of SK are described in the clause 9.6.1 of this SK PS.

### **1.3.2 Registration Authorities**

Registration Authority (RA) and its roles are defined in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

Obligations and warranties of RA are described in the clause 9.6.2 of this SK PS.

### **1.3.3 Subscribers**

Subscriber is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

Obligations and warranties of Subscriber are described in the clause 9.6.3 of this SK PS.

### **1.3.4 Relying Parties**

Relying Party is defined in the clause 1.6.1 in this SK PS.

Obligations and warranties of Relying Party are described in the clause 9.6.4 of this SK PS.

### **1.3.5 Other Participants**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **1.4 Certificate Usage**

### **1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **1.5 Policy Administration**

### **1.5.1 Organisation Administering the Document**

This SK PS is administered by SK.

SK ID Solutions AS

Registry code 10747013

Pärnu Ave 141, 11314 Tallinn

Tel +372 610 1880

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Email: [info@skidsolutions.eu](mailto:info@skidsolutions.eu)

<https://www.skidsolutions.eu/>

### **1.5.2 Contact Person**

Head of Trust Services

Email: [info@skidsolutions.eu](mailto:info@skidsolutions.eu)

### **1.5.3 Person Determining SK PS Suitability for the Policy**

Not applicable.

### **1.5.4 SK PS Approval Procedures**

Amendments which do not change the meaning of trust services practice, such as corrections of misspellings, translation and updating of contact details, are documented in the versions and changes section of the present document and the fraction part of the document version number shall be enlarged.

In the case of substantial changes, the new Trust Service Practice Statement version is clearly distinguishable from the previous ones. The new version bears a serial number enlarged by one. The amended SK PS along with the enforcement date, which cannot be earlier than 30 days after publication, is published electronically on SK's website.

SK has a right to publish before publication of SK PS the draft version of the document. The Subscriber has the chance to provide reasoned comments within 30 days of publication of draft version. The amended version of SK PS is published electronically on SK's website 30 days before its enforcement.

SK PS is approved by Head of Trust Services and enforced by SK Chief Executive Officer. SK ensures that the practices are properly implemented by conducting regular internal audits and conformity assessments.

## 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

### 1.6.1 Terminology

Certificate Revocation List	a list of invalid (revoked, suspended) certificates.
Directory Service	certificate publication service.
eIDAS Regulation	Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
Electronic Signature (i.e. e-Signature)	data in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which is used by the signatory to sign.
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance).
Policy	a set of rules that indicates the applicability of a Trust Service Token to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.
Practice Statement	a statement of the practices that a TSP employs in providing a Trust Service.
Private key	the key of a key pair that is kept secret by the holder of the key pair, and that is used to create Electronic Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding public key.
Public Key	the key pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of corresponding private key and that is used by Relying Party to verify Electronic Signatures created with the holder's corresponding private key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding private key.
Registration Authority	entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of certificates. Additionally, an RA accepts certificate applications, checks the applications and/or forwards the applications to the CA.
Relying Party	a recipient of a Trust Service token who acts in reliance on that Trust Service Token.

	NOTE: Relying Parties include parties verifying a Electronic Signature using a public key certificate.
Root CA	the top level Certification Authority whose certificate is distributed by application software suppliers and that issues subordinate SK CA certificates.
Qualified e-Signature (i.e. Qualified Electronic Signature)	means an advanced electronic signature that is created by a qualified electronic signature creation device, and which is based on a qualified certificate for electronic signatures; Before 01.07.2016 term “digital signature” was used instead of qualified Electronic Signature in Estonia and SK documents.
Sensitive Information	information which allows for simulation or replication of service, or also for the destruction or publication of the service private key. It also includes personal information.
SK CA	a Certification Authority of SK whose certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another subordinate CA
Subscriber	an entity subscribing with Trust Service Provider who is legally bound to any Subscriber obligations.
Subscriber Certificate	public key of a user, together with some other information, rendered un-forgable by encipherment with the private key of the Certification Authority, which issued it.
Supervisory Body	the authority which is designated by member state to carry out the supervisory activities over Trust Services and Trust Service Providers under eIDAS in the territory of that member state.
Time-Stamping Unit	a set of hardware and software which is managed as a unit and has a single time-stamp signing key active at a time
Trust Service	described in eIDAS[1] as an electronic service which is normally provided in return for remuneration and which consists of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the creation, verification, and validation of Electronic Signatures, electronic seals or electronic time-stamps, electronically registered delivery services and certificates related to these services or;</li> <li>• the creation, verification and validation of certificates for website authentication or;</li> <li>• the preservation of Electronic Signatures, seals or certificates related to these services.</li> </ul>
Trust Service Provider	an entity that provides one or more electronic Trust Services.
Trust Service Token	a physical or binary (logical) object generated or issued as a result of the use of a Trust Service (e.g. certificate).
Qualified Trust Service Provider	means a trust service provider who provides one or more qualified trust services and is granted the qualified status by the Supervisory Body.

## 1.6.2 Acronyms

CA	Certification Authority
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
HSM	Hardware Security Modules

NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
QSCD	Qualified Signature Creation Device
RA	Registration Authority
SK	SK ID Solutions AS
SK PS	SK ID Solutions AS Trust Services Practice Statement
TSA	Time-Stamping Authority
TSP	Trust Service Provider
TSU	Time-Stamping Unit
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time

## 2 Publication and repository responsibilities

### 2.1. Repositories

SK ensures that its repository is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with a minimum of 99,44% availability overall per year with a scheduled downtime that does not exceed 0,28% annually.

### 2.2. Publication of Information

SK publishes in its public information repository following information:

- overview of its certification hierarchy <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/>;
- Trust Services Practices Statement <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/trust-services-practice-statement/>;
- Certification Practice Statements <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/certification-practice-statement/>;
- Time-Stamping Authority Practice Statement and Terms and Conditions for Use of Time-Stamping Service <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/time-stamping-principles-and-conditions-for-use/>;
- audit results <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/compliance-audit/>;
- conditions for insurance policy <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/insurance-policy/>;
- certification policies <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/certificate-policies/>;
- certificates, including root certificates and CA certificates under which certificates for subscribers are issued, and Certificate Revocation Lists <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/certificates/>;
- profiles <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/profiles/>;
- conditions for use of certificates <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/conditions-for-use-of-certificates/>;
- General Terms of Subscriber Agreement <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/general-terms-of-subscriber-agreement/>;
- requirements by SK <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/requirements-by-sk/>;
- LDAP directory service <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/ldap/>;
- Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy) <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/data-protection/>;
- legislation <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/legislation/>.

#### 2.2.1. Publication and Notification Policies

This SK PS is published in SK's public information repository.

SK PS along with the enforcement dates is published no less than 30 days prior taking effect.

#### 2.2.2. Items not Published in the Practice Statement

Refer to clause 9.3.1 of this SK PS.

### 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

Refer to clause 2.2.1 of SK PS.

Information on certification status is published in accordance with relevant service-based Policies and/or Practice Statements.

### **2.3.1. Directory Service**

SK publishes information on certificates and their validity generally via LDAP directory service.

The purpose of LDAP directory service is to provide the Subscribers, Relying Parties and other persons access to the certificates register to make inquiries about certificates and their validity.

The directory service meets the following requirements:

- LDAP directory contains valid (i.e. not revoked and not expired) certificates;
- LDAP directory does not contain special categories of personal data in the meaning of GDPR;
- LDAP directory is accessible in a public data communications network 24 hours a day.

### **2.4. Access Controls on Repositories**

Information published in SK's repository is public and not considered confidential information.

SK has implemented security measures and enforced access control in order to prevent unauthorized access to add, delete, or modify entries into its repository. Publishing into SK's repository is restricted to authorized employees of SK.



### **3. Identification and authentication**

#### **3.1. Naming**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **3.2. Initial Identity Validation**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **4. Certificate life-cycle operational requirements**

### **4.1. Certificate Application**

#### **4.1.1. Who can Submit a Certificate Application**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **4.1.2. Enrolment Process and Responsibilities**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **4.1.3. Annual Control of QSCD**

SK monitors certification status of QSCD-s in use and annually checks that QSCD is recognised by verifying validity of Common Criteria Certificate issued for the QSCD or that it is continuously valid in the European Commission's list of Secure Signature Creation Devices, Qualified Signature and Seal Creation Devices notified by the member states.

If the validity in the European Commission's list of Secure Signature Creation Devices, Qualified Signature and Seal Creation Devices notified by the member states is expired due to the modification, then SK will investigate the cause of the modification from the responsible member state or/and designated certification body. If the QSCD certificate is expired or invalidated, then SK will take following actions:

- notify immediately its Supervisory Body and conformity assessment body;
- revoke Trust Service Tokens based on the investigation results;
- inform all affected subscribers and relying parties.

### **4.2. Certificate Application Processing**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.3. Certificate Issuance**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.4. Certificate Acceptance**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.6. Certificate Renewal**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.7. Certificate Re-Key**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.8. Certificate Modification**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **4.10. Certificate Status Services**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

Certificate status information request for unknown certificates is monitored.

#### **4.11. End of Subscription**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### **4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## 5. Facility, management, and operational controls

In the field of security management, SK guides itself by the generally recognised standards, e.g. ISO/IEC 27001 [5], and other standards required by regulations and law.

SK's security management policy documents include the security controls and operating procedures for SK facilities, systems and information assets providing the services. SK carries out and revises risk assessment regularly at least once in the year in order to evaluate business risks and determine the necessary security requirements and operational procedures. SK management approves risk assessment and accepts the residual risks identified.

SK management establishes the security policy, which forms a basis for consistency and completeness of information security and management support.

SK Chief Executive Officer approves policies and practices related to information security for the overall SK services. SK management communicates information security policies and procedures to employees and relevant external parties who are impacted by it. In addition, SK management sets out SK approach to manage information security objectives for Trust Services, including auditable procedures for internal control.

SK has achieved ISO/IEC 27001: 2013 certification.

### 5.1. Physical Controls

SK is using physically separated space in rented server rooms specifically designed for data centre operations. It is the responsibility of the owner of the premises to provide necessary environment for the equipment. A Service Level Agreement is arranged between SK and the owner of the premises to guarantee uninterrupted and secure operation.

#### 5.1.1. Site Location and Construction

SK services are conducted within a physically protected environment that deters, prevents, and detects unauthorised use of, access to, or disclosure of Sensitive Information and systems whether covert or overt.

The protection provided is commensurate with the identified risks. SK ensures that physical access to critical services is controlled and that physical risks to its assets are minimised.

#### 5.1.2. Physical Access

SK data centres are protected by a minimum of three tiers of physical security, with access to the lower tier required before gaining access to the higher tier. Access to the highest tier requires the participation of two persons in Trusted Roles.

The employees of SK may gain access to the facilities concerned with Trust Services of SK only on the basis of an approved list. A log is kept for recording all entries to the data processing centre of SK.

The owner of the premises has no independent access to SK-s servers.

Any persons entering this physically secure area will not remain there without oversight by an authorised person.

#### 5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning

SK's secure facilities are equipped with:

- power systems to ensure continuous, uninterrupted access to electric power; and
- heating, ventilation, air conditioning systems to control the temperature and relative humidity.

#### **5.1.4. Water Exposures**

SK has taken reasonable precautions to minimise the impact of water exposure to the information systems.

#### **5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection**

SK has taken reasonable precautions to prevent and extinguish fires or other damaging exposure to flame or smoke. The fire prevention and protection measures of SK have been designed to comply with local fire safety regulations.

#### **5.1.6. Media Storage**

Portable media, appliances and software may be removed from the premises of SK pursuant to the established procedure. Data media containing Sensitive Information may be stored only in a special fireproof safe designed for storing data media.

#### **5.1.7. Waste Disposal**

Media containing Sensitive Information are securely disposed of when no longer required. Paper documents and materials with Sensitive Information are shredded before disposal. Media used to collect or transmit Sensitive Information are rendered unreadable before disposal. Any media with Sensitive Information removed from use (removable media, hard disks etc.) are sanitised when decommissioned or recycled for other use, to prevent data leaks.

#### **5.1.8. Off-Site Backup**

SK performs routine backups of critical system data, audit log data, and other Sensitive Information. SK has dual data centres to ensure availability requirements. Databases in dual data centres are synchronised in real time. In addition, routine backups are performed. Backups of the most critical information (e.g. keys and configurations) are kept off-site in secure storage.

### **5.2. Procedural Controls**

#### **5.2.1. Trusted Roles**

The following Trusted Roles critical for security have been defined:

- Security Officer: she or he is responsible for the administration of and the implementation of the security practices;
- System Administrators: they are responsible for the installation, configuration and maintenance of the information system of SK, including performing the system backup and recovery
- System Auditor or Evaluator: she or he is responsible for periodically reviewing procedures; for that he/she has access to monitor the document archives and information system audit logs;
- RA Officer: she or he is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of certificates and may be responsible for registration, certificate suspension, termination of suspension and revocation procedures.

SK has separated System Administrators with internal regulation into two roles called A- and B-type. The assignment is made person by person with a decree of the CEO. See clause 5.2.2 for details.

Employees are assigned into Trusted Role with internal regulation of SK, which defines also the functions and responsibility related to the Trusted Role. Employees in Trusted Role have job descriptions as well.

SK ensures that personnel have achieved trusted status, and departmental approval is given before such personnel are:

- issued access devices and granted access to the required facilities; or
- issued electronic credentials to access and perform specific functions on SK or other IT systems.

Security operations are managed by SK personnel in Trusted Roles, but may actually be performed by a non-specialist, operational personnel (under supervision), as defined within the roles and responsibility documents. All requirements and rules for or concerning personnel in Trusted Roles apply equally to personnel with the temporary or permanent employment contract.

### **5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task**

SK has established, maintains and enforces rigorous control procedures to ensure the segregation of duties based on job responsibility and to ensure that multiple persons in Trusted Roles are required to perform sensitive tasks.

The following activities require a minimum of two System Administrators in Trusted Roles, specifically one in A-type and other in B-type:

- generation of certification keys;
- backup of the certification keys;
- restoration of the certification keys;
- management of HSM-s and CA core systems located in secured zone;
- physical visit to data centres.

Backup and restore functions are performed by backup software, which is managed by System Administrators in Trusted Roles. Configuration changes and restoration procedures are authorized according to SK internal procedures.

### **5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role**

All Trusted Roles are performed by persons assigned into this role by the management and accepted by this person to fulfil this role.

SK has implemented an access control system, which identifies authorities and registers all SK information system users in a trustworthy manner.

User accounts are created for personnel in specific roles that need access to the system in question. All users must log in with their personal account, and administrative commands are only available with explicit permission and auditing of the execution. File system permissions and other features available in the operating system security model are used to prevent any other use.

User accounts are locked as soon as possible when the role change dictates. Access rules are audited annually.

### **5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties**

The Trusted Roles of the Security Officer, System Auditor and System Administrators are completely separate and are staffed by different persons. A single person cannot be simultaneously A- and B-type of System Administrator.

## **5.3. Personnel Controls**

### **5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements**

The employees of SK have received adequate training and have all the necessary experience for carrying out the duties specified in the employment contract and job description before they perform any operational or security functions.

The employment contracts signed by the employees of SK provide for the following obligations:

- to maintain the secrecy of confidential information that has come to their knowledge in the course of their performance,

- to prevent them from holding business interests in a company, which may affect their judgment in the supply of the service and
- to ensure that they have not been punished for a wilful crime.

All personnel in Trusted Roles are free from any interests that may affect their impartiality regarding Trust Service operations. The conflict of interests is avoided by separation of duties. Personnel in Trusted Roles is not allowed to accept the certificate application for him/herself as Subscriber or for the legal person as Subscriber represented by him/her. If SK as Trust Service provider or its RA applies for a certificate for itself, personnel in Trusted Roles is obliged to follow all required procedures without exceptions (including identity validation) as defined in service-based policies and practice statements.

### **5.3.2. Background Check Procedures**

For all personnel seeking to become personnel in Trusted Roles, the verification of identity is performed through the physical presence of such personnel before the personnel in Trusted Roles can perform SK operational or security functions. Furthermore, officially recognised documents of identification e.g., ID card or passports are checked. Suitability is further confirmed through background checking procedures.

Background verification checks are carried out in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and principles of ethics. The checks are proportional to the business requirements, the classification of the information to be accessed, and the perceived risks. These checks are conducted on all candidates for employment and on contracted partners directly performing the Trust Service providing operations with access to production data.

Background checks about criminal record are refreshed periodically.

### **5.3.3. Training Requirements**

The employees of SK have received adequate training and have all the necessary experience for carrying out the duties specified in the employment contract and job description before they perform any operational or security functions.

SK ensures that all personnel performing managerial duties with respect to the operation of SK receive comprehensive awareness training in:

- security principles and rules in SK;
- SK internal regulations and processes;
- duties they are expected to perform.

### **5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

The requirements of this SK PS 5.3.3 will be kept current to accommodate changes in SK system. Refresher training will be conducted as required, and SK is testing security awareness of all personnel at least once a year.

### **5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

No rotation used.

### **5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

SK establishes, maintains and enforces employment policies (as part of SK Security Policy) for the discipline of personnel following unauthorised actions. Disciplinary actions include measures up to and including termination and will be commensurate with the frequency and severity of the unauthorised actions.

### **5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements**

SK uses sub-contractors in Trusted Roles specified in the service-based Practice Statement. In this case SK delegates and defines the relevant requirements to the sub-contractor according to its role and tasks. The sub-contractor is responsible for compliance with defined requirements and its personnel acting in Trusted Roles.

### **5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel**

Persons in Trusted Roles receive the requisite training and other documentation needed to perform their job responsibilities competently and satisfactorily.

## **5.4. Audit Logging Procedures**

### **5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded**

SK ensures that all relevant information concerning the operation of the Trust Services is recorded for providing evidence for the purpose of legal proceedings. This information includes the archive records that are required for proving the validity of Trust Service Tokens and the audit log of the Trust Service operation.

SK's information systems leave an audit log of:

all events relating to the life cycle of keys and certificates managed by SK, including CA and TSU keys and certificates and Subscriber key pairs.

SK's and/or RA information systems leave an audit log of:

- all events related to registration, including requests for certificate re-key and renewal;
- all registration information, including identity proofing:
  - type of document(s) presented by the applicant to support registration;
  - record of unique identification data, numbers, or a combination thereof of identification documents;
  - storage location of copies of applications and identification documents;
  - identity of the RA employee accepting the application;
  - method used to validate identification documents;
  - name of receiving TSP/submitting Registration Authority;
- all requests and reports relating to suspension and termination of suspension;
- all requests and reports relating to revocation, as well as the resulting actions.

Additionally, SK logs:

- all significant security events, including changes in the security policy settings, system start-up and shutdown, system crashes and hardware failures, changes in firewall configuration and rule base and PKI system access attempts, the activities of system users with superuser rights;
- all events relating to the synchronisation of the clock to UTC, the detection of loss of synchronisation.

### **5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log**

Personnel responsible of system and/or application administration and authorised into Trusted Role of system administrator are responsible for regular review of their system/applications logs and creating automated searches for product failure discovery and event correlation. Defining meaningful output for events and triggers, documenting the configuration and necessary actions to be taken in case of event



detection is responsibility of the system administrators based on the systems ownership. System auditor is processing logs for problem solving, periodical reviews and audits.

#### **5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log**

Audit logs are retained on-site for no less than 7 years until 31.12.2015. From 01.01.2016 audit logs are retained on-site no less than 10 years.

Logs regarding security events and events related to the clock synchronisation are kept according to internal risk assessment for time period necessary for legal proceedings.

In case of termination SK audit logs are retained and accessible until abovementioned term for retention accordance with clause 5.8 of this SK PS.

#### **5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log**

SK uses information security solutions confirming with the standards, which ensure non-recording of private keys, activation codes, access codes (e.g. PIN) or other security critical information in the audit log.

All logs are stored locally and are sent to the central log server. The central log servers implement the logging policy – retention and archiving.

SK is implementing security controls for protecting integrity of application logs.

Internal development process defines security requirements for logging process and logs, including protection of logs.

Non-electronic audit information is protected from unauthorised viewing, modification and destruction through organisational means.

Access to the audit log is limited on the role/privilege basis.

Should the audit log concerning the operation of services be required for the purposes of providing evidence of the correct operation of the services and for the purpose of legal proceedings, they are made available to legal authorities and/or persons whose right of access to them arises from the law.

#### **5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures**

SK performs regular backups of critical system data, audit log data, and other Sensitive Information. Audit log data backup is the part of general back-up system. SK has defined backup strategy and policies in internal regulations.

#### **5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)**

Automated audit data is generated and recorded at the application, network and operating system level. Non-electronically generated audit data is recorded by SK persons in Trusted Roles.

#### **5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject**

No stipulations.

#### **5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments**

Events in the audit process are logged, in part, to monitor system vulnerabilities. Security vulnerability assessments are performed, reviewed, and revised. These assessments are based on real-time automated logging data and are performed on a daily, monthly, and annual basis.

## **5.5. Records Archival**

### **5.5.1. Types of Records Archived**

Physical or digital archive records about certificate applications, signed Subscriber agreements, registration information (including evidences of Subscriber identity verification) and requests or applications for suspension, termination of suspension and revocation are retained.

### **5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive**

Physical or digital archive records about certificate applications, signed Subscriber agreements, registration information (including evidences of Subscriber identity verification) and requests or applications for suspension, termination of suspension and revocation are retained at least for 10 years after validity of relevant certificate.

In case of termination SK archive records are retained and accessible until abovementioned term for retention accordance with clause 5.8 of this SK PS.

### **5.5.3. Protection of Archive**

The archive is located in a dedicated room and is protected by access control systems. The media holding the archive data and the applications required to process the archive data are maintained to ensure that the archive data can be accessed for the time period required.

### **5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures**

The archive is not backed up.

### **5.5.5. Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records**

Database entries contain accurate time and date information. The time-stamps are not cryptography-based.

### **5.5.6. Archive Collection System (Internal or External)**

SK uses an internal archive collection system.

SK and RA-s may use external archive collection system for physical archive records.

### **5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information**

Only authorised personnel in Trusted Roles are allowed access to the archive.

Should the records concerning the operation of services be required for the purposes of providing evidence of the correct operation of the services and for the purpose of legal proceedings, they are made available to legal authorities and/or persons whose right of access to them arises from the law.

The integrity of the information is verified during recovery tests. The archive systems with built-in integrity controls are in use.

## **5.6. Key Changeover**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery**

### **5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures**

SK has implemented a business continuity management framework, which covers procedures of risk assessment, incident handling (includes a response to incidents and disasters), recovery and recovery exercises.

SK carries out a regular risk assessment of SK's Trust Services to prevent possible danger to the availability of SK's operations and to minimise the risk of losing control of the Trust Services. SK carries out the risk assessment at least once in the year. The list of situations considered as emergency situations is determined by the risk assessment. The result of the risk assessment includes the requirements for recovery plans and recovery testing scenarios. The recovery plans and testing scenarios include at least the following threats:

- for SK CA and SK TSA, the private key used for the provisioning of the service is compromised or there is a serious suspicion thereof;
- for SK TSA, the loss of synchronisation of a time-stamping service clock.

The procedures for the handling of information security incidents, emergency situations and critical vulnerabilities are documented in SK Internal Crisis Management Regulation. The objective of that regulation is the immediate response and recovery of availability and the continuous protection of SK services, including take necessary follow-up and improvement activities in order to avoid similar situations. SK Internal Crisis Management Regulation shall establish that a person is appointed with responsibility for implementation of follow-up activities or proposals for change.

In case of private CA key compromise SK will additionally:

- indicate that Trust Service Tokens and validity information issued using this CA or TSU key may no longer be valid;
- revoke any CA and TSU certificate that has been issued for SK when SK is informed of the compromise of another CA or TSA;
- inform all affected subscribers and relying parties.

In case of algorithm or associated parameters become insufficient for its remaining intended usage SK will additionally:

- schedule a revocation of any affected Trust Service Token;
- inform all affected subscribers and relying parties.

Recovery plans are tested annually.

The critical vulnerability is addressed no later than 48 hours after its discovery; the vulnerability is remediated or a mitigation plan is created and implemented to reduce the impact of vulnerability or a decision has been made and documented that remediation is not required.

In the event of an emergency, SK will inform all the Subscribers and Relying Parties immediately (or at least within 24 hours of the crisis committee's decision) of the emergency situation and proposed solution through public information communication channels.

SK will inform without undue delay but in any event within 24 hours after having become aware of it, the Supervisory Body and, where applicable, other relevant bodies as national CERT of any breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on the Trust Service provided.

If breach is likely to involve personal data and is likely to result in high risk to the rights and freedoms of the natural person, SK will notify Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate without undue delay, but at least in 72 hours after initial discovery of the personal data breach.

### **5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted**

The event of the corruption of computer resources, software and data is handled according to SK internal Crisis Management Regulation.

### **5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures**

SK private key compromise is handled according to SK Internal Crisis Management Regulation.

#### 5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster

In order to ensure the business continuity capabilities after a disaster SK organises periodically crisis management trainings. SK Internal Crisis Management Regulation defines how crisis management and communication take place in emergency situations.

There is an internal agreement about priorities for systems and services recovery after the emergency situation or/and service interruption. SK maintains necessary back-up copies and archives to able to restore data after the emergency situation. Backups of the most critical information (e.g. keys and configurations) are kept off-site in secure storage. Back-up arrangements are regularly tested to ensure that they meet the business continuity requirements.

SK has dual data centres to ensure the availability of services. SK office and data centres are independent of each other. In case of the emergency in data centres guidance's, source codes and other necessary materials are available from SK Office. In case of the emergency situation in SK office services in data centres will continue to work.

#### 5.8. CA Termination

SK has defined internal termination plan and keeps it up-to-date.

SK considers scheduled termination the end of life cycle or decommissioning of the technical instance of a qualified Trust Service corresponding to one or more service entries in the Trusted List of Estonia (subordinate CA certificate expires and its private key usage period comes to an end).

Unscheduled termination of a qualified trust service shall take place in case of:

- business reasons;
- takeover, merging or acquisition;
- its qualified status is withdrawn from the trusted list of Estonia by Supervisory Body.

In both cases, scheduled or unscheduled termination SK creates detailed action plan with timeframe for the execution of termination actions and considering the requirements and internal procedures of SK. SK ensures that potential disruptions to Subscribers and Relying Parties are minimised as a result of the cessation of SK's Trust Services, and in particular, it ensures the continued maintenance of information required to verify the correctness of Trust Service Tokens.

Before scheduled and unscheduled termination of Trust Service, the following procedures will be executed:

- SK informs all Subscribers, relevant authorities such as Supervisory Body and other entities with which SK has agreements or other forms of established relations. In addition, this information will be made available to other Relying Parties;
- SK destroys the CA and TSU private keys, including backup copies or keys withdrawn from use in such a manner that the private keys cannot be retrieved;
- SK reinitialises or destroys any hardware appliances related to this service depending on the security regulations;
- SK terminates authorisation of all subcontractors to act on behalf of SK in carrying out any functions relating to the process of issuing Trust Service Tokens for this service;

In case of scheduled termination SK maintains the logs and documentation related to the supply of the Trust Service and information needed to verify the Trust Service Tokens.

In case of unscheduled termination, SK's obligations, including maintenance of logs and the documentation related to the terminated Trust Service may be transferred to SK's owners based on the Commercial Code. Transfer of SK's obligations to its owners shall not be carried into effect if an agreement to transfer SK's

obligations to a contractual or a third party has been concluded. SK will consider doing arrangements with other Trust Service Provider to transfer the provision of services for its existing customers.

The notice of termination of SK's Trust Service will be published in the public media. SK does not assume liability for any loss or damage sustained by the user of the service as a result of such termination provided that SK has given the notice of termination through public information communication channels at least one month in advance.

SK has arrangements to cover the costs to fulfil these minimum requirements in case the TSP goes bankrupt, or for other reasons, is unable to cover the costs by itself.

The requirements for termination has to be fulfilled also in case of RA termination as much they are applicable. SK takes over the documentation and information related to the supply of the Trust Service and provides evidence of the operation or makes arrangement with RA regarding maintenance within required time-period in accordance this SK PS.

## 6. Technical security controls

### 6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation

SK uses cryptographic keys for its Trust Services and follows industry best practices for key lifecycle management, key length and algorithms.

#### 6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

The signing keys of SK Trust Services are created in accordance with the internal regulations of SK: Procedure for Creating SK Root Key and Procedure for Creating Keys for Intermediate Certification Authorities. For the key ceremony of SK Trust Service key pair generation for all CA's (whether root or intermediate CA-s), OCSP responders or TSA-s, the commission is appointed by CEO with internal regulation. The commission has to include external auditor independent of SK, who confirms the correctness of the procedure and report of key ceremony. SK does not increase the number of personnel authorized to carry out CA key pair generation unless it is not necessary.

Procedure for SK Trust Service key pair generation is carried out according to the detailed instruction created for the specific procedure. The creation of SK's Trust Service keys is observed by a commission, which after the creation of the keys draws up an appropriate deed containing the public key of the created pair of keys and the hash thereof.

The Trust Service key pair generation and the private key storage occur in the HSM, which is used for providing keys that at least meet the requirements established in the security standard FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3. The HSM protects the key from external compromise and operates in a physically secure environment.

SK has documented procedure for conducting SK Trust Service key pair generation. Head of the commission creates a report proving that the ceremony was carried out in accordance with the stated procedure and that the integrity and confidentiality of the key pair was ensured. Report is signed by the commission members, including external auditor. The more detailed procedures for key ceremony, roles and responsibilities of participants during and after procedure, requirements for report and collected evidence are defined in SK internal Regulation of the Key Procedures.

Early enough before expiration of its Trust Service certificate, SK generates a new Trust Service certificate for signing subject key pairs and apply all necessary actions to avoid disruptions of any operations that rely on the certificate and to allow all relying parties to become aware of key changeover. Common name of the Trust Service certificate always contains the number of the year which it was created. The new Trust Service certificate is generated and distributed according to this SK PS and service-related practice statements. Cross-certificates is not issued and used by SK.

The Subscriber Private Key generation is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### 6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### 6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### 6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

All SK Trust Services public keys are distributed in the form of X.509 certificates issued by SK CA. The primary distribution mechanism for SK Trust Service certificates is via SK repository at <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/>. SK takes obligation to provide SK Trust Service certificates to Trusted List of Estonia.

### **6.1.5. Key Sizes**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking**

The Trust Service key pair for all CA-s (whether root or intermediate CA-s) is generated in the HSM certified with FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3 standard according to the profile specified in relevant service-based Practice Statement. Key pair generation is observed by the commission nominated by the CEO of SK.

### **6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

### **6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls**

The HSM used by SK are certified with FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3 standard and the FIPS mode is activated. Through the HSM lifecycle, SK verifies that cryptographic module software and hardware versions are certified under FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3. This information is published in NIST under Cryptographic Module Validation Program. SK checks this information regularly, at least twice a year and by event driven manner.

SK verifies that HSM is not tampered after its receive and installation. This is documented according to internal procedures. SK verifies that HSM is functioning correctly during usage. Cryptographic module standards and controls for cryptographic devices which carry the Subscriber Private Key is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement. In services where Subscriber is issued QSCD the parties involved in QSCD handling and storing apply appropriate measures to prevent unauthorised access to QSCDs prior their issuance to Subscriber.

### **6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control**

The access to SK Trust Service keys is divided into two parts that are secured by different persons in Trusted Roles. For activation of the signing key of SK the presence of at least two authorized persons is required in accordance with clause 5.2.2 of this PS.

### **6.2.3. Private Key Escrow**

SK Trust Service private keys are held in secure cryptographic devices certified with the FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or FIPS PUB 140-3 Level 3 standard. The activation and use of the private key requires multi-person control as explained in clause 6.2.2 in this SK PS.

Subscriber Private Keys escrow is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.2.4. Private Key Backup**

To meet the availability requirements, a backup copy are made of SK Trust Service private keys by securely cloning them into the backup HSM. Key access is divided into two parts that are secured by different persons. A security envelope is used for storing the certification key of SK and the opening of this envelope can be established. The certification keys of SK can be used only when they are activated. For activation of the certification key of SK the presence of at least two authorised persons is required as explained in clause 6.2.2 in this SK PS.

The Subscriber's Private Keys backup is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.2.5. Private Key Archival**

SK will not archive SK Trust Service private keys after it has expired. All copies of SK Trust Service private keys are destroyed after their expiry or revocation so that further use or derivation thereof is impossible.

The Subscriber's Private Keys archival is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.2.6. Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module**

All SK Trust Service keys must be generated by and in the cryptographic module. SK generates Trust Service key pairs in the HSM in which the keys will be used.

### **6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

SK Trust Service Private Keys held in the HSM are stored in encrypted form.

The Subscriber's Private Keys storage is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key**

SK Trust Service private keys are activated according to the specifications of the cryptographic module manufacturer. For activation of the certification key of SK the presence of at least two authorised persons is required as explained in clause 6.2.2 of this SK PS.

Method of activating Subscriber Private Key is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key**

SK Trust Service private keys are deactivated when an attempt is made to open the security module used for storage of the keys, when the configuration is changed, the power supply is disconnected or transferred or in other events endangering the security.

Method of deactivating Subscriber Private Key is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key**

Method of the destroying SK Trust Service private keys and internal control mechanisms depend from the options available to specific secure cryptographic module.

### **6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating**

Refer to the clause 6.2.1 of this SK PS.

## **6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management**

### **6.3.1. Public Key Archival**

All certificates issued (including all expired or revoked certificates) are retained and archived as part of SK routine backup procedures. The retention period is indefinite.

### **6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods**

The operational period of a certificate ends upon revocation. The operational period for key pairs is the same as the operational period for the certificates, except that public key may continue to be used for signature verification.

Trust Service certificate key pair's private key will be not used beyond the end of certificate's lifecycle. SK does not issue Subscriber certificates, which exceed the lifetime of the Trust Service certificate. In



addition, SK stops issuing new certificates at an appropriate date prior to the expiration of the Trust Service certificate such that no Subscriber certificate expires after the expiration of the Trust Service certificate.

If an algorithm or the appropriate key length offers no sufficient security during the validity period of the certificate, the concerned certificate will be revoked, and a new certificate application will be initiated. The applicability of cryptographic algorithms and parameters is constantly supervised by SK management. For Subscriber certificates, the validity period is defined in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **6.4. Activation Data**

### **6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation**

SK Trust Service private key activation data generation and installation is performed according to the user manual of HSM.

The Subscriber's Private Key PINs generation and installation is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.4.2. Activation Data Protection**

HSM is kept in secure storage and access to it have only authorized personnel in Trusted Roles. The Subscriber's Private Key PINs protection is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **6.5. Computer Security Controls**

### **6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

SK ensures that the certification system components are secure and correctly operated, with an acceptable risk of failure.

SK trust service system components are managed in accordance with defined change management procedures. These procedures include system testing in an isolated test environment and the requirement that change must be approved by the Security Officer. The approval is documented for further reference.

All critical software components of SK are installed and updated from trusted sources only. There are also internal procedures to protect the integrity of certification service components against viruses, malicious and unauthorised software.

All media containing production environment software and data, audit, archive, or backup information are stored within SK with appropriate physical and logical access controls designed to limit access to authorised personnel and protect such media from accidental damage (e.g., water, fire, and electromagnetic). Media management procedures and backup of records and data to different media types protects against obsolescence and deterioration of media within the period of time that records are required to be retained. Media containing Sensitive Information are securely disposed of when no longer required. All removable media are used only for the intended period of the user (either by time or by number of uses).

The performance of SK services and IT systems and their capacity is monitored by Service Managers and changes are done when necessary according to internal change management procedure.

Incident response and vulnerability management procedures are documented in an internal document. Monitoring system detects and alarms of abnormal system activities that indicate potential security violation, including intrusion into the network.

Paper documents and materials with Sensitive Information are shredded before disposal. Media used to collect or transmit Sensitive Information are rendered unreadable before disposal.

SK security operations include: operational procedures and responsibilities, secure systems planning and acceptance, protection from malicious software, backups, network management, active monitoring of audit logs event analysis and follow-up, media handling and security, data and software exchange.

SK has implemented security measures and enforced access control in order avoid unauthorized access and attempts to add, delete or modify information in applications related to the services, including certificates and revocation status information. User accounts are created for personnel in specific roles that need access to the system in question. SK's personnel are authenticated before using critical applications related to the services. Multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance is enforced. All users must log in with their personal account, and administrative commands are only available with explicit permission and auditing of the execution. File system permissions and other features available in the operating system security model are used to prevent any other use. User accounts are removed as soon as possible when the role change dictates. Access rules are audited annually.

### **6.5.2. Computer Security Rating**

SK uses standard computer systems.

## **6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls**

### **6.6.1. System Development Controls**

An analysis of security requirements is carried out at the design and requirements specification stage of any systems development project undertaken by SK; or an analysis is carried out on behalf of SK to ensure that security is built into the Information Technology's systems.

The software will be approved by the Security Officer and will originate from a trusted source. New versions of software are tested in a testing environment of the appropriate service and their deployment is conducted according to documented change management procedures. Changes to systems are documented.

### **6.6.2. Security Management Controls**

Measures are implemented in the information system of SK, including all workstations for guaranteeing the integrity of software and configurations, as well as for detecting fraudulent software and restricting its spread.

Only the software directly used for performing the tasks is used in the information system.

### **6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls**

SK policies, assets and practices (including SK PS) for information security are reviewed by person which is responsible for administering and maintaining them at planned intervals - at least annually or in case of significant changes to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.

The configurations of SK systems are regularly checked for changes that violate SK security policies. A review of configurations of the issuing systems, security support systems, and front-end/internal-support systems occurs at least on a weekly basis. The Security Officer approves changes that have an impact on the level of security provided.

SK has procedures for ensuring that security patches are applied to the certification system within a reasonable time period after they become available, but not later than six months following the availability of the security patch. The reasons for not applying any security patches will be documented.

SK manages the registration of information assets and classifies all information assets into security classes according to the results of the regular security analysis consistent with the risk assessment. A responsible person has been appointed for all important information security assets.

## 6.7. Network Security Controls

SK network is divided into zones by security requirements. Communication between the zones is restricted. Only the protocols needed for SK services are allowed through the firewalls.

There are separate and dedicated firewalls in place for enforcing the security policy. Access to the administrative interfaces of IT equipment is not directly accessible from the public Internet. For the most critical tasks a separate workstation is used.

The front-end systems are in a DMZ protected by a firewall and TLS offload servers. Actual security-critical services and corresponding HSMs run in a secure zone that is separated by dedicated firewall and has no direct Internet access.

The root CA is in a high security zone and is air-gapped from all the other networks. SK systems are configured with only these accounts, applications, services, protocols, and ports that are used in the Trust Service operations.

SK ensures that only personnel in Trusted Roles have access to a secure zone and a high security zone. The cabling and active equipment along with their configuration in SK internal network are protected by physical and organisational measures.

SK operates multiple data centres in separate sites and with separate duplicated external network connection for redundancy to ensure high level availability of the Trust Services. Communication between sites is cryptographically secured.

All data centres are considered to be in a common internal secure network carrying the DMZ and secure zone. The transfer of Sensitive Information outside SK internal network is encrypted.

Communication between distinct trustworthy systems is established through trusted channels that are logically distinct from other communication channels and provide assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

Development and test environments are physically isolated from production and have different networks.

The security of SK internal network and external connections is constantly monitored to prevent all access to protocols and services not required for the operation of the Trust Services.

SK performs a vulnerability scan once in a quarter on public and private IP addresses identified by SK.

SK undergoes a penetration test on the certification systems annually at the set up and after the infrastructure or application upgrades or modifications determined significant by SK.

SK records evidence that each vulnerability scan and penetration test was performed by a person or entity with the skills, tools, proficiency, code of ethics, and independence necessary to provide a reliable report.

## 6.8. Time-Stamping

SK is providing time-stamping service as qualified Trust Service and is specified in SK ID Solution AS Time-Stamping Authority Practice Statement [6].

SK does not use time-stamping in relation to certification service. Database entries contain accurate time and date information. The time information is not cryptographic-based. The maximum allowed time variance in all parts of the certification system is 1 second. This is guaranteed by an internal Reference Clock service, according to which the chronologies of all parts of the certification system are synchronised. The Reference Clock uses GPS (Global Positioning System) as a primary time source which determines preciseness of the time in SK system.

Time signal can be traced back to one of the official UTC(k) laboratories.

Time used for all Trust Service operations (including revocation services, time-stamping service, audit log events recording etc) is synchronized with UTC at least once per hour.

## **7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP profiles**

### **7.1. Certificate Profile**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **7.2. CRL Profile**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

### **7.3. OCSP Profile**

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## 8. Compliance audit and other assessments

### 8.1. Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

The conformity of information system, policies and practices, facilities, personnel, and assets of SK are assessed by a conformity assessment body pursuant to the eIDAS regulation [1], the corresponding legislation and standards or whenever a major change is made to Trust Service operations.

SK's internal auditor carries out an regular internal audits according to the annual audit plan approved by CEO.

### 8.2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

Conformity assessment body is accredited in accordance with Regulation EC no 765/2008 as competent to carry out conformity assessment of qualified Trust Service Provider and qualified Trust Services it provides.

### 8.3. Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

The auditor of the conformity assessment body shall be independent from SK and SK assessed systems.

The internal auditor shall not audit his/her own areas of responsibility.

### 8.4. Topics Covered by Assessment

The conformity assessment covers the conformity of information system, policies and practices, facilities, personnel, and assets with eIDAS regulation, respective legislation and standards. Conformity assessment body audit the parts of SK information system used to provide Trust Services.

The areas of activity subject to internal auditing are the following:

- quality of service;
- security of service;
- security of operations and procedures;
- protection of the data of Subscribers and security policy, performance of work procedures and contractual obligations, as well as compliance with SK PS and service-based Policies and Practice statements.

The Conformity Assessment Body and the Internal Auditor also audit these parts of the information system, policies and practices, facilities, personnel, and the assets of sub-contractors that are related to providing SK Trust Services (e.g. including RA-s).

### 8.5. Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

In the event of a result showing deficiency in the assessment, the Supervisory Body requires SK to remedy any failure to fulfil requirements within a time limit (if applicable) set by the Supervisory Body. SK makes efforts to stay compliant and fulfil all requirements of the deficiency on time. SK management is responsible to implement a corrective action plan. SK evaluates the significances of deficiencies and prioritizes appropriate actions to be taken at least during the time limit declared by Supervisory Body or reasonable period of time. Where personal data protection rules appear to have been breached, the Supervisory Body shall inform the data protection authority of the results of the compliance audit.

### 8.6. Communication of Results

Audit conclusions or certificate(s) for trust service(s), which are based on audit results of the conformity assessment conducted pursuant to the eIDAS regulation, corresponding legislation and standards, are published on SK's website <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/>.

In addition, SK submits the resulting conformity assessment report to the Supervisory Body within a period of three working days of receiving it. SK submits the audit conclusions or certificate(s) for trust service(s) to maintainers of the Browsers Root Programs in which SK is participating and other interested parties.

## 9. Other business and legal matters

### 9.1. Fees

#### 9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### 9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees

SK's public directory service with valid and activated certificates is available via the LDAP at ldap.sk.ee free of charge.

#### 9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

#### 9.1.4. Fees for Other Services

Fees for services are specified in SK's price list or in the Subscriber's or Relying Party's agreement.

#### 9.1.5. Refund Policy

SK handles refund requests case-by-case.

### 9.2. Financial Responsibility

#### 9.2.1. Insurance Coverage

In accordance with the relevant legislation, SK publishes the terms of the compulsory insurance policy on its website <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/insurance-policy/>.

#### 9.2.2. Other Assets

According to relevant agreements SK may give some additional warranties.

#### 9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

Refer to clause 9.2.1 of this SK PS.

### 9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information

#### 9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information

All information that has become known while providing services and that is not intended for publication (e.g. information that had been known to SK because of operating and providing Trust Services) is confidential. Subscriber has a right to get information from SK about him/herself according to legal acts.

#### 9.3.2. Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

Any information not listed as confidential or intended for internal use is public information.

Information considered public in SK is listed in clause 2.2 of this SK PS.

Additionally, non-personalised statistical data about SK's services is also considered public information. SK may publish non-personalised statistical data about its services.

#### 9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

SK secures confidential information and information intended for internal use from compromise and refrains from disclosing it to third parties by implementing different security controls.

Disclosure or forwarding of confidential information to a third party is permitted only with the written consent of the legal possessor of the information on the basis of a court order or in other cases provided by law.

## 9.4. Privacy of Personal Information

### 9.4.1. Personal Data Protection Principles

SK's principles of personal data protection are described in the Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy). The principles are published on SK's website <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/data-protection/>.

By adhering to the above-mentioned principles, SK guarantees compliance with General Data Protection Regulation [10], the Personal Data Protection Act [7] and other relevant data protection acts as well as non-disclosure of confidential information and adequacy of subscriber's information storage.

### 9.4.2. Personal Information Processed by SK

The scope of personal information processed by SK is described in the Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy) [8].

### 9.4.3. Responsibility to Protect Private Information

SK ensures protection of personal information by implementing security controls as described in chapter 5 of this SK PS.

### 9.4.4. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

The exact terms under which the subscriber grants SK his/her notice and consent to use his/her personal information are described in the Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy) [8].

### 9.4.5. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

The circumstances under which SK may disclose the subscriber's personal information to third parties are described in the Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy) [8].

### 9.4.6. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

The circumstances under which SK may disclose the subscriber's personal information to third parties are described in the Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy) [8].

## 9.5. Intellectual Property Rights

SK obtains intellectual property rights to this SK PS.

## 9.6. Representations and Warranties

### 9.6.1. Trust Service Provider Representations and Warranties

SK is party to the mutual agreements and obligations between the TSP, Subscribers, and Relying Parties. This SK PS and service-based Practice Statements are integral parts of these agreements.

SK shall:

- provide its services consistent with the requirements and the procedures defined in this SK PS and service-based policies and practice statements;
- carry overall responsibility for conformance with the procedures defined in this SK PS and service-based policies and practices statements;
- comply with eIDAS regulation [1] and related legal acts defined in this SK PS and service-based policies and practice statements;
- publish its SK PS and service-based policies and practice statements and guarantee their availability in a public data communications network;



- publish and meet its claims in terms and conditions for subscribers and guarantee their availability and access in a public data communications network;
- maintain confidentiality of the information which has come to its knowledge in the course of supplying the service and is not subject to publication;
- keep account of the Trust Service Tokens issued by it and their validity and ensure possibility to check the validity of certificates;
- inform the Supervisory Body of any changes to a public key used for the provision Trust Services;
- without undue delay but in any event within 24 hours after having become aware of it, notify the Supervisory Body and, where applicable, other relevant bodies as national CERT of any breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on the Trust Service provided;
- without undue delay but in any event within 72 hours after initial discovery, notify Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate of the personal data breach, which is likely to result in high risk to the rights and freedoms of the natural person;
- where the breach of security or loss of integrity or personal data breach is likely to adversely affect a natural or legal person to whom the Trusted Service has been provided, notify the natural or legal person of the breach without undue delay;
- preserve all the documentation, records and logs related to Trust Services according to the clauses 5.4 and 5.5;
- ensure a conformity assessment according to requirements and present the conclusion of conformity assessment body to the Supervisory Body to ensure continual status of Trust Services in the Trusted List;
- have the financial stability and resources required to operate in conformity with this SK PS;
- publish the terms of the compulsory insurance policy and the conclusion of conformity assessment body in a public data communications network.

An employee of SK may not have been punished for an intentional crime.

SK has a documented agreements and contracts with its subcontracting and outsourcing parties provisioning services. SK has defined in these agreements and contracts the liability, relevant requirements and right to audit subcontracting and outsourcing parties to be ensured that they are bound to implement any requirements and controls required by SK.

In accordance with the relevant legislation, SK does its best to guarantee that all potential service users, especially people with disabilities, can access services provided by SK on an equal basis. SK accepts that its services imply at least some sort of qualitative capabilities and legal capacity, but nonetheless truly aspires to provide trust services and related technical solutions in a non-discriminating way.

### **9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties**

RA shall:

- provide its services consistent with the requirements and the procedures defined in the contract between SK and RA, in this SK PS and service-based Policies and Practice statements;
- provide its employees with necessary training for supply of high-quality service;
- without undue delay after having become aware of it, notify SK of any breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on the Trust Service provided or on the personal data maintained therein.

An employee of RA may not have been punished for an intentional crime.

### 9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties

The Subscriber shall:

- observe the requirements provided by SK in this SK PS and the respective service-based policies and/or practice statements;
- supply true and adequate information in the application for the services, and in the event of a change in the data submitted, he/she shall notify the correct data in accordance with the rules established in the service-based policies and practice statements;
- be aware of the fact that SK may refuse to provide the service if the Subscriber has intentionally presented false, incorrect or incomplete information in the application for the service;
- be solely responsible for the maintenance of his/her private key and Trust Service Tokens. The Subscriber shall use his/her private key and Trust Service Tokens in accordance with this SK PS, service-based practice statements and service terms and conditions.

### 9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties

A Relying Party shall:

- study the risks and liabilities related to the acceptance of Trust Service Tokens. The risks and liabilities have been set out in this SK PS, in the appropriate service-based policies and practice statements and in the service terms and conditions.
- verify the validity of Trust Service Tokens on the basis of validation services offered by SK using published information on SK's website <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/> or applicable validation service or appropriate cryptographic information.

### 9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

Specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## 9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties

SK:

- is liable for the performance of all its obligations specified in clause 9.6.1 to the extent prescribed by the legislation of the Republic of Estonia;
- has compulsory insurance contracts, which cover all SK Trust Services to ensure compensation for damage which is caused as a result of violation of the obligations of SK.

SK is not liable for:

- the secrecy of the private keys or parts of the private keys of the Subscribers unless SK is held liable in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement;
- possible misuse of the certificates;
- inadequate checks of the certificates or for the wrong decisions of a Relying Party or any consequences due to errors or omission in Trust Service Token validation checks;
- the non-performance of its obligations if such non-performance is due to faults or security problems of the Supervisory Body, the data protection supervision authority or any other public authority or Trusted List;
- non-fulfilment of the obligations arising from SK PS if such non-fulfilment is occasioned by Force Majeure.

## **9.8. Limitations of Liability**

The upper limit of the liability for any claim is established in the referred policy available at <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/insurance-policy/>.

## **9.9. Indemnities**

Indemnities between the Subscriber and SK are regulated in service-based Terms and Conditions.

## **9.10. Term and Termination**

### **9.10.1. Term**

Refer to clause 2.2.1 of this SK PS.

### **9.10.2. Termination**

This SK PS and/or service-based Practice Statements remain in force until they are replaced by a new version or when they are terminated due to Trust Service or SK's termination.

Upon SK's termination, SK is obliged to ensure the protection of personal and confidential information.

### **9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival**

SK communicates the conditions and effect of this SK PS's and/or service-based Practice Statements termination via its public repository. The communication specifies which provisions survive termination.

At a minimum, all responsibilities related to protecting personal and confidential information, also maintenance of public information of repository, SK archives for determined period and logs survive termination. All Subscriber agreements remain effective until the certificate is revoked or expired, even if this SK PS and/or service-based Practice Statements terminate.

Termination of this SK PS and/or service-based Practice Statements cannot be done before termination actions described in clause 5.8 of this SK PS.

## **9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants**

In general, SK's website <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/> will be used to make any type of notification and communication.

Other means of individual notices and communication is specified in relevant service-based Policy and/or Practice Statement.

## **9.12. Amendments**

### **9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment**

Refer to clause 1.5.4 of this SK PS.

### **9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period**

Refer to clause 2.2.1 of this SK PS.

### **9.12.3. Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed**

Not applicable.

## **9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions**

All disputes between the parties will be settled by negotiations. If the parties fail to reach an amicable agreement, the dispute will be resolved at the court of the location of SK.

The other parties will be informed of any claim or complaint not later than 30 calendar days after the detection of the basis of the claim, unless otherwise provided by law.

The Subscriber or other party can submit their claim or complaint on the following email: [info@skidsolutions.eu](mailto:info@skidsolutions.eu).

## 9.14. Governing Law

This SK PS is governed by the jurisdictions of the European Union and the Republic of Estonia.

## 9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law

SK ensures compliance with the legal requirements to meet all applicable statutory requirements for protecting records from loss, destruction and falsification, and the requirements of the following:

- eIDAS - Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC [\[1\]](#);
- Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [\[13\]](#)
- Personal Data Protection Act [\[7\]](#);
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) effective from 25.05.2018 [\[11\]](#);
- Related European Standards:
  - ETSI EN 319 401 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers [\[2\]](#);
  - ETSI EN 319 411-1 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements [\[9\]](#);
  - ETSI EN 319 411-2 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates [\[9\]](#);
  - ETSI EN 319 421 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security Requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing Time-Stamps [\[12\]](#);
- CA/Browser Forum, Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates [\[3\]](#);
- Related norms of countries, where Trust Services are provided.

## 9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions

### 9.16.1. Entire Agreement

SK contractually obligates each RA and other participants to comply with this SK PS and applicable industry guidelines. SK also requires each party using its products and services to enter into an agreement that delineates the terms associated with the product or service. If an agreement has provisions that differ from this SK PS, then the agreement with that party prevails, but solely with respect to that party. Third parties may not rely on or bring action to enforce such agreement.

### 9.16.2. Assignment

Any entities operating under this SK PS may not assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of SK. Unless specified otherwise in a contract with a party, SK does not provide notice of assignment.

### **9.16.3. Severability**

If any provision of this SK PS is held invalid or unenforceable by a competent court or tribunal, the remainder of SK PS remains valid and enforceable. Each provision of this SK PS that provides for a limitation of liability, disclaimer of a warranty, or an exclusion of damages is severable and independent of any other provision.

### **9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)**

SK may claim indemnification and attorneys' fees from a party for damages, losses, and expenses related to that party's conduct. SK's failure to enforce a provision of this SK PS does not waive SK's right to enforce the same provision later or right to enforce any other provision of this SK PS. To be effective, waivers must be in writing and signed by SK.

### **9.16.5. Force Majeure**

The subject of Force Majeure and other parties are responsible for any consequences caused by circumstances beyond his reasonable control, including but without limitation to war (whether declared or not), acts of government or the European Union, export or import prohibitions, breakdown or general unavailability of transport, general shortages of energy, fire, explosions, accidents, strikes or other concerted actions of workmen, lockouts, sabotage, civil commotion and riots.

Communication and performance in the case of Force Majeure are regulated between the parties with the agreements.

Non-fulfilment of the obligations arising from SK PS and/or relevant service-related Policies and/or Practice Statements is not considered a violation if such non-fulfilment is occasioned by Force Majeure. None of the parties shall claim damage or any other compensation from the other parties for delays or non-fulfilment of this SK PS and/or relevant service-related Policies and/or Practice Statements caused by Force Majeure.

## **9.17. Other Provisions**

Not applicable.

## 10. References

- [1] eIDAS - Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC;
- [2] ETSI EN 319 401 V2.3.1 (2021-05) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers;
- [3] RFC 3647 – Request For Comments 3647, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt>;
- [4] ISO/IEC 27001: 2013 Information technology - Security techniques -Information security management systems – Requirements;
- [5] SK ID Solutions AS Time-Stamping Authority Practice Statement, published: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/time-stamping-principles-and-conditions-for-use/> ;
- [6] Personal Data Protection Act RT I, 04.01.2019, 11;
- [7] Principles of Processing Personal Data (Privacy Policy), published: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/resources/data-protection/>;
- [8] ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.4.1 (2023-10) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements;
- [9] ETSI EN 319 411-2 V2.5.1 (2023-10) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates.
- [10] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance);
- [11] ETSI EN 319 421 V1.2.1 (2023-05) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security Requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing Time-Stamps;
- [12] Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act, RT I, 25.10.2016, 1.