

## SK ID Solutions AS – Certification Practice Statement for ECCRCA

Version 2.0

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Document Information	
Date	Changes
12.05.2021 2.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Clause 1.1 - updated figure depicting ECCRCA relations;</li><li>• clause 1.1, 2.1, 2.2.1, 3.2.6, 4.4.2, 9.15 - Removed references to Microsoft, Apple and Mozilla requirements due to termination of TLS Certificates' service;</li><li>• clause 1.5.2, 1.5.4 - Replaced business development manager with head of trust services;</li><li>• clause 1.6.1 - Corrected term 'Certificate'</li><li>• throughout the document updated SK company name and web domain name.</li></ul>
01.01.2017 1.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• First public version.</li></ul>

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## 1. Introduction

SK ID Solutions AS (hereinafter referred to as SK) was founded on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The owners of the limited liability company are AS Swedbank, AS SEB Pank and Telia Eesti AS. The principal activities of SK are offering trust services and related technical solutions.. These services guarantee secure and verified electronic communication with public institutions as well as businesses in everyday life.

The current CPS is a complete rewrite of “Certification Practice Statement of AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus” [1] and “Certificate Policy of EE Certification Centre Root CA” [2]. Restructuring the documents according to IETF RFC 3647 [3] does not substantially change provisions of the service.

Inspired by the ETSI EN 319 400 series, SK has divided its documentation into three parts:


- SK Trust Services Practice Statement (SK PS) describes general practices common to all trust services;
- Certification Practice Statements and Time-Stamping Practice Statements describe parts that are specific to each Subordinate CA or Time-Stamping Unit;
- Technical Profiles are in separate documents.

Pursuant to the IETF RFC 3647 [3] this CPS is divided into nine parts. To preserve the outline specified by RFC 3647 [3], section headings that do not apply have the statement "**Not applicable**". References to SK PS [4] and Certificate Profile documents [5] are included where applicable.

### 1.1. Overview

This CPS describes the practices used to operate EE Certification Centre Root CA (ECCRCA) to issue intermediate CA certificates.

Their relations between Root CA, Subordinate CAs and the CPs are shown on the following figure:



ECCRCA is the current issuing CA.

### 1.2. Document Name and Identification

This document is called “AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus – Certification Practice Statement for ECCRCA.”

## 1.3. PKI Participants

### 1.3.1. Certification Authorities

SK operates as a CA.

The certification service of SK covers all procedures described in this CPS related to lifecycle of keypairs and certificates.

SK does not use third parties to issue and maintain certificates issued by ECCRCA.

ECCRCA is identified by the following certificate:

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

54:80:f9:a0:73:ed:3f:00:4c:ca:89:d8:e3:71:e6:4a

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA/emailAddress=pki@sk.ee

Validity

Not Before: Oct 30 10:10:30 2010 GMT

Not After : Dec 17 23:59:59 2030 GMT

Subject: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA/emailAddress=pki@sk.ee

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus (2048 bit):

00:c8:20:c0:ec:e0:c5:4b:ab:07:78:95:f3:44:ee:

fb:0b:0c:ff:74:8e:61:bb:b1:62:ea:23:d8:ab:a1:

65:32:7a:eb:8e:17:4f:96:d8:0a:7b:91:a2:63:6c:

c7:8c:4c:2e:79:bf:a9:05:fc:69:5c:95:8d:62:f9:

b9:70:ed:c3:51:7d:d0:93:e6:6c:eb:30:4b:e1:bc:

7d:bf:52:9b:ce:6e:7b:65:f2:38:b1:c0:a2:32:ef:

62:b2:68:e0:61:53:c1:36:95:ff:ec:94:ba:36:ae:

9c:1c:a7:32:0f:e5:7c:b4:c6:6f:74:fd:7b:18:e8:

ac:57:ed:06:20:4b:32:30:58:5b:fd:cd:a8:e6:a1:

fc:70:bc:8e:92:73:db:97:a7:7c:21:ae:3d:c1:f5:

48:87:6c:27:bd:9f:25:74:81:55:b0:f7:75:f6:3d:

a4:64:6b:d6:4f:e7:ce:40:ad:0f:dd:32:d3:bc:8a:

12:53:98:c9:89:fb:10:1d:4d:7e:cd:7e:1f:56:0d:

21:70:85:f6:20:83:1f:f6:ba:1f:04:8f:ea:77:88:

35:c4:ff:ea:4e:a1:8b:4d:3f:63:1b:44:c3:44:d4:

25:76:ca:b7:8d:d7:1e:4a:66:64:cd:5c:c5:9c:83:

e1:c2:08:88:9a:ec:4e:a3:f1:3e:1c:2c:d9:6c:1d:

a1:4b

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

12:F2:5A:3E:EA:56:1C:BF:CD:06:AC:F1:F1:25:C9:A9:4B:D4:14:99

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication, Code Signing, E-mail Protection, Time Stamping, OCSP Signing

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

7b:f6:e4:c0:0d:aa:19:47:b7:4d:57:a3:fe:ad:bb:b1:6a:d5:  
0f:9e:db:e4:63:c5:8e:a1:50:56:93:96:b8:38:c0:24:22:66:  
bc:53:14:61:95:bf:d0:c7:2a:96:39:3f:7d:28:b3:10:40:21:  
6a:c4:af:b0:52:77:18:e1:96:d8:56:5d:e3:dd:36:5e:1d:a7:  
50:54:a0:c5:2a:e4:aa:8c:94:8a:4f:9d:35:ff:76:a4:06:13:  
91:a2:a2:7d:00:44:3f:55:d3:82:3c:1a:d5:5b:bc:56:4c:22:  
2e:46:43:8a:24:40:2d:f3:12:b8:3b:70:1a:a4:96:b9:1a:af:  
87:41:1a:6a:18:0d:06:4f:c7:3e:6e:b9:29:4d:0d:49:89:11:  
87:32:5b:e6:4b:04:c8:e4:5c:e6:74:73:94:5d:16:98:13:95:  
fe:fb:db:b1:44:e5:3a:70:ac:37:6b:e6:b3:33:72:28:c9:b3:  
57:a0:f6:02:16:88:06:0b:b6:a6:4b:20:28:d4:de:3d:8b:ad:  
37:05:53:74:fe:6e:cc:bc:43:17:71:5e:f9:c5:cc:1a:a9:61:  
ee:f7:76:0c:f3:72:f4:72:ad:cf:72:02:36:07:47:cf:ef:19:  
50:89:60:cc:e9:24:95:0f:c2:cb:1d:f2:6f:76:90:c7:cc:75:  
c1:96:c5:9d

### 1.3.2. Registration Authorities

Not applicable.

### 1.3.3. Subscribers

SK is the Subscriber in the context of this CPS.

### 1.3.4. Relying Parties

A Relying Party is a natural or legal person who takes a decision relying on the Certificate issued by SK.

### 1.3.5. Other Participants

Not applicable.

## 1.4. Certificate Usage

Only subordinate CA and servicing certificates are issued according to this CPS.

The CPS does not restrict usage of the certificates in different software's or areas.

## 1.5. Policy Administration

### 1.5.1. Organisation Administering the Document

This CPS is administered by SK.

SK ID Solutions AS

Registry code 10747013

Pärnu mnt 141, 11314 Tallinn

Tel +372 610 1880

Fax +372 610 1881

Email: [info@skidsolutions.eu](mailto:info@skidsolutions.eu)

<http://www.skidsolutions.eu/en>

### 1.5.1. Contact Person

Head of Trust Services

Email: [info@skidsolutions.eu](mailto:info@skidsolutions.eu)

### 1.5.2. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

Not applicable.

### 1.5.3. CPS Approval Procedures

Amendments which do not change the meaning of the CPS, such as corrections of misspellings, translation and updating of contact details, are documented in the Versions and Changes section of the present document and the fraction part of the document version number is enlarged.

In case of substantial changes, the new CPS version is clearly distinguishable from the previous ones. The new version bears a serial number enlarged by one. The amended CPS along with the enforcement date is published electronically on SK's website.

All amendments are to be approved by the head of trust services and the amended CPS is enforced by the CEO.

## 1.6. Definitions and Acronyms

### 1.6.1. Terminology

In this CPS the following terms have the following meaning.

Term	Definition
Certification Practice Statement	One of several documents forming the governance framework in which certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.
Certificate Profile	Document that determines the profile and minimum requirements for the Certificate.
Certificate Revocation List	A list of invalid (revoked, suspended) certificates.
Certification Service	Issuing certificates, managing suspension, termination of suspension, revocation, modification and re-key.
Directory Service	Certificate validity information publication service.
Certificate	Public Key, together with additional information laid down in the respective Certificate Profile and rendered unforgeable via encipherment using the Private Key of the Certificate Authority which issued it.
Private Key	The key of a key pair that is kept secret by the holder of the key pair, and that is used to create digital signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding public key.
Public Key	The key pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of corresponding private key and that is used by Relying Party to verify digital signatures created with the holder's corresponding private key and/or to encrypt

	messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding private key.
Relying Party	Entity that relies upon either the information contained within a certificate.
eIDAS Regulation	Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
OCSF	Protocol for checking certificate validity
Root CA	Highest level certification authority, whose certificate is bundled with application software and that issues certificates to subordinate CA-s.
SK CA	Certification authority of SK, whose certificate is signed by Root CA or another subordinate CA.
Supervisory body	An institution, designated by Member State to carry out supervision according to eIDAS regulation over trust services and trust service providers on the territory of Member State.
Trust Service	Described in eIDAS Regulation [6] as an electronic service offered for a fee that covers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- creation, verification and validity confirmation of electronic signatures, electronic seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registration services and certificates related to these services;</li> <li>- creation, verification and validity confirmation of certificates for website authentication</li> <li>- maintaining the certificates related to electronic signatures, stamps or services related to them</li> </ul>
Trust Service Provider	Organisation that provides at least one Trust Service

### 1.6.2. Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
CA	Certification Authority
ECCRCA	EE Certification Centre Root CA
CPS	Certification Practice Statement for ECCRCA
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
HSM	Hardware Security Module
SK	SK ID Solutions AS, provider of the certification services
SK PS	SK ID Solutions AS Trust Services Practice Statement [4]



## **2. Publication and repository responsibilities**

### **2.1. Repositories**

Refer to clause 2.1 of SK ID Solutions AS Trust Services Practice Statement [\[4\]](#) (SK PS).

### **2.2. Publication of Certification Information**

Refer to clause 2.2 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### **2.2.1. Publication and Notification Policies**

This CPS is published on SK's website: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/CPS/>.

#### **2.2.2. Items not Published in the Certification Practice Statement**

Refer to clause 9.3.1 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### **2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication**

Refer to clause 1.5.4 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### **2.4. Access Controls on Repositories**

Refer to clause 2.4 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

## 3. Identification and authentication

### 3.1. Naming

#### 3.1.1. Types of Names

Types of names assigned to the Subscriber are described in the Certificate Profile [5].

#### 3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful

Meanings of names on different fields of the certificate are described in the Certificate Profile [5].

#### 3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

Not allowed.

#### 3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Rules for interpreting various name forms are described in the Certificate Profile [5].

#### 3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

SK guarantees that multiple certificates with identical distinguished names are not valid at the same time.

#### 3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

Not allowed.

### 3.2. Initial Identity Validation

#### 3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

Possession of Private Key is guaranteed by internal procedures of SK. Procedures are carried out by persons named by CEO of SK and an external auditor.

#### 3.2.2. Authentication of Organisation and Domain Identity

Not applicable

#### 3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

CEO of SK defines a commission of at least 4 persons to carry out key generation and certification procedures. The head of commission is nominated also by CEO.

An independent auditor is observing the key generation procedures and identifies the personnel carrying out the procedure and verifies their authorisation.

#### 3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information

Not allowed.

#### 3.2.5. Validation of Authority

CEO of SK nominates personnel carrying out the procedures of key generation and certification.

#### 3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

ECCRCA does not cross-certify other Root CA-s.

### 3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests

Not applicable.

### **3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request**

Refer to clause 3.2.3 of this CPS.

## 4. Certificate life-cycle operational requirements

### 4.1. Certificate Application

#### 4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

CEO of SK approves certificate applications.

#### 4.1.2. Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

CEO of SK approves the application for Key Generation and Certification and nominates list of persons to carry out the procedure, contents, time and place of the procedure.

CEO of SK nominates at least 4 persons and one independent external auditor to carry out the key generation and certification procedures.

### 4.2. Certificate Application Processing

#### 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Refer to clause 3.2.3 of this CPS.

#### 4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

CEO of SK decides approval or rejection of the certificate application.

The applications must contain at least the following information:

- reference to the Certification Practice Statement or usage area in case of servicing certificates;
- notice about details of key generation;
- distinguished name and validity period of the requested certificate.

#### 4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications

CEO of SK defines the time to process the application.

### 4.3. Certificate Issuance

#### 4.3.1. CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

The certificate is issued manually from an off-line part of information system of SK based on the regulation of CEO of SK. The procedure is carried out by the commission mandated by CEO.

The certificate is valid from the moment of issuance.

After issuance of a certificate, a new CRL is issued and a fresh backup of the database of ECCRCA is made.

#### 4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

The procedure is documented in a way that shows the activities done and the certificate issued. The document is signed by members of the commission.

### 4.4. Certificate Acceptance

#### 4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

A member of the commission verifies that the issued certificate is correct.

#### 4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA

The certificate is published on webpage of SK: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/certs/>.

#### **4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

Refer to clause 4.4.2 of this CPS.

### **4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

#### **4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

The Subscriber is required to use the Private Key and the Certificate in accordance with CPS of the CA to be certified.

#### **4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

Relying Party is required to use the Subscriber's Public Key and the Certificate in accordance with CPS of the CA to be certified.

### **4.6. Certificate Renewal**

Not applicable.

### **4.7. Certificate Re-Key**

Not applicable.

### **4.8. Certificate Modification**

#### **4.8.1. Circumstances for Certificate Modification**

Certificate Modification is allowed to correct mistakes in previous certificate.

#### **4.8.2. Who can request Certificate Modification**

CEO of SK can request Certificate Modification.

#### **4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests**

Refer to clause 4.2 of this CPS.

#### **4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

Refer to clause 4.3.2 of this CPS.

#### **4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate**

Refer to clause 4.4.1 of this CPS.

#### **4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA**

Refer to clause 4.4.2 of this CPS.

#### **4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

Refer to clause 4.4.3 of this CPS.

### **4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

#### **4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation**

Refer to clause 4.9.1.2 of CA/Browser Baseline Requirements for Issuing and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates [10].

#### **4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation**

Request for revocation is submitted to CEO of SK in a signed form.

#### **4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request**

The application for revocation can be submitted only to CEO of SK.

The application is checked for correctness and validity according to presented evidence and other available information.

After revoking the certificate SK issues immediately a new CRL which contains the serial number of the revoked certificate.

#### **4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period**

Not applicable.

#### **4.9.5. Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request**

SK will process the revocation request within 5 working days after receiving the application.

#### **4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties**

Relying Party must verify the validity of a certificate before trusting it.

#### **4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency**

CRL is issued once every 90 days, with the value of the next Update field set to 97 days after issuance of CRL.

#### **4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs**

CRL is published no later than 1 working day after issuance.

#### **4.9.9. On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability**

Refer to clause 4.10.1 of this CPS.

#### **4.9.10. On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements**

Relying Party is obliged to check the status of a certificate.

#### **4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

Information about revocation of a certificate can be requested by e-mail at [info@skidsolutions.eu](mailto:info@skidsolutions.eu) or by phone +372 6101880.

#### **4.9.12. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise**

A security incident must be opened in case of Key Compromise.

#### **4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension**

Not applicable.

### **4.10. Certificate Status Services**

#### **4.10.1. Operational Characteristics**

SK offers CRL and OCSP services for checking certificate status. Services are accessible over HTTP protocol. The status of a certificate can be verified using OCSP protocol at <http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA> and using CRL at <http://sk.ee/crls/eccrca/eccrca.crl>. The URLs of the services are included in the certificates on the CRL Distribution Point (CDP) and Authority Information Access (AIA) fields respectively in accordance with the Certificate Profile [5].

#### **4.10.2. Service Availability**

SK ensures availability of Certificate Status Services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with a minimum of 99.44% availability overall per year with a scheduled downtime that does not exceed 0.28% annually.

#### **4.10.3. Operational Features**

None.

#### **4.11. End of Subscription**

Not applicable.

#### **4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery**

Not applicable.

## 5. Facility, management, and operational controls

Refer to clause 5 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).



## 6. Technical security controls

### 6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation

Refer to clause 6.1 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### 6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

Refer to clause 6.1.1 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### 6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

Not applicable.

#### 6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

The public key is delivered using removable media and the auditor verifies its integrity.

#### 6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

Refer to clause 6.1.4 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### 6.1.5. Key Sizes

According to this CPS keys shorter than 2048-bit RSA and 224-bit ECC are not certified. Key size for each CA to be certified is defined case-by-case according to effective security rules at the moment of issuance.

#### 6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

Refer to clause 6.1.6 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### 6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

Key usage purposes are described in the Certificate Profile [\[5\]](#).

### 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

Refer to clause 6.2 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

Refer to clause 6.3 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 6.4. Activation Data

Refer to clause 6.4 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 6.5. Computer Security Controls

Refer to clause 6.5 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls

Refer to clause 6.6 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 6.7. Network Security Controls

Refer to clause 6.7 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 6.8. Time-Stamping

Refer to clause 6.8 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

## 7. Certificate, crt, and ocsf profiles

### 7.1. Certificate Profile

The Certificate profile is described in the Certificate Profile [5], published in SK's public information repository <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/profiles/>.

### 7.2. CRL Profile

The CRL profile is described in the Certificate Profile [5], published in SK's public information repository <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/profiles/>.

### 7.3. OCSP Profile

The OCSP profile is described in the Certificate Profile [5], published in SK's public information repository <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/profiles/>.

## 8. Compliance audit and other assessments

Refer to chapter 8 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

## 9. Other business and legal matters

### 9.1. Fees

Not applicable.

### 9.2. Financial Responsibility

#### 9.2.1. Insurance Coverage

Refer to clause 9.2.1 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### 9.2.2. Other Assets

Not applicable.

#### 9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

Refer to clause 9.2.1 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information

Refer to clause 9.3 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 9.4. Privacy of Personal Information

Refer to clause 9.4 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 9.5. Intellectual Property Rights

Refer to clause 9.5 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### 9.6. Representations and Warranties

#### 9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties

Refer to clause 9.6.1 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

SK ensures that:

- the certification keys are protected by HSM and are under sole control of SK;
- in case of compromise of certification keys all issued certificates will be revoked;
- all the activated certification keys are on the territory of Republic of Estonia;
- the certification keys used in the supply of the certification service are activated on the basis of shared control.

#### 9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties

Not applicable.

#### 9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties

Not Applicable.

#### 9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties

Refer to clause 9.6.4 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

A Relying Party studies the risks and liabilities related to acceptance of the Certificate. The risks and liabilities have been set out in this CPS.

### **9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

Not applicable.

### **9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties**

Refer to clause 9.7 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### **9.8. Limitations of Liability**

Refer to clause 9.8 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### **9.9. Indemnities**

Not applicable.

### **9.10. Term and Termination**

#### **9.10.1. Term**

Refer to clause 1.5.4 of this CPS.

#### **9.10.2. Termination**

Refer to clause 9.10.2 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

#### **9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival**

SK communicates the conditions and effect of the termination of this CPS via its public repository. The communication specifies which provisions survive termination.

At a minimum, all responsibilities related to protecting confidential information, also maintenance of SK archives for determined period and logs survive termination.

Termination of this CPS cannot occur before termination actions described in clause 5.8 of this CPS.

### **9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants**

Refer to clause 9.11 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### **9.12. Amendments**

#### **9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment**

Refer to clause 1.5.4 of this CPS.

#### **9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period**

Refer to clause 2.2.1 of this CPS.

#### **9.12.3. Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed**

Not applicable.

### **9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions**

Refer to clause 9.13 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

### **9.14. Governing Law**

This CPS is governed by the jurisdictions of the European Union and Estonia.

## 9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law

SK ensures compliance with all requirements to comply with laws to protect data against loss, destroying or forging, and the following requirements:

- eIDAS - Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC [\[1\]](#);
- Relevant European standards:
  - ETSI EN 319 401 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI): General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers [\[7\]](#);
  - ETSI EN 319 411-1 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements [\[8\]](#);
  - ETSI EN 319 411-2 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates [\[9\]](#).

## 9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions

### 9.16.1. Entire Agreement

Not applicable.

### 9.16.2. Assignment

Any entities operating under this CPS may not assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of SK. Unless specified otherwise in a contract with a party, SK does not provide notice of assignment.

### 9.16.3. Severability

If any provision of this CPS is held invalid or unenforceable by a competent court or tribunal, the remainder of the CPS remains valid and enforceable. Each provision of this CPS that provides for a limitation of liability, disclaimer of a warranty, or an exclusion of damages is severable and independent of any other provision.

### 9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)

SK may claim indemnification and attorneys' fees from a party for damages, losses, and expenses related to that party's conduct. SK's failure to enforce a provision of this CPS does not waive SK's right to enforce the same provision later or right to enforce any other provision of this CPS. To be effective, waivers must be in writing and signed by SK.

### 9.16.5. Force Majeure

Refer to clause 9.16.5 of SK PS [\[4\]](#).

## 9.17. Other Provisions

Not applicable.

## 10. References

1. AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus – Certificate Practice Statement, published: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/CPS/>;
2. AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus - Certification Policy of ECCRCA, published: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/CP/>;
3. RFC 3647 – Request For Comments 3647, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework;
4. AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus Trust Services Practice Statement, published: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/sk-ps/>;
5. Certificate CRL and OCSP Profile for Organisation Certificates Issued by SK, published: <https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/profiles/>;
6. eIDAS - Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC;
7. ETSI EN 319 401 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI): General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers;
8. ETSI EN 319 411-1 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements;
9. ETSI EN 319 411-2 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates;
10. CA/Browser Forum, Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates (V1.7.3), published: <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/>;